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Abstract:  Using exogenous secondary school assignments to remove self-selection bias to schools and 
peers within schools, I credibly estimate both (1) the effect of attending schools with higher-achieving 
peers, and (2) the direct effect of short-run peer quality improvements within schools, on the same 
population. While students at schools with higher-achieving peers have better academic achievement, 
within-school short-run increases in peer achievement improve outcomes only at high-achievement 
schools. Short-run (direct) peer quality accounts for only one tenth of school value-added on average, but 
at least one-third among the most selective schools. There are large and important differences by gender. 
 
  In many nations, there is fierce competition for scarce slots at selective schools (Hsieh 
and Urquiola 2006, Hastings and Weinstein 2008). This is, in part, because students at more 
selective schools typically have better outcomes ─ giving the impression of sizable benefits to 
attending selective, and often prestigious, schools. However, because motivated and high-
achieving students tend to select to these schools, these differences may reflect selection rather 
than selective schools providing greater value-added. Addressing this selection problem, Jackson 
(2010) uses a quasi-experimental design and finds that attending a more selective school in 
Trinidad and Tobago has positive effects on exam performance and high-school graduation. 
While not all studies find positive selective school effects (e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et. al. 2011), 
similar positive effects have been found in Romania (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2010), the 
United Kingdom (Clark 2008), and the United States (Dobbie and Fryer 2011).  
  The effect of attending a more selective school reflects both short-run peer effects (that 
arise from contemporaneous interactions with higher-achieving classmates in addition to 
interactions with parents and teachers) and the effect of inputs that may be endogenous to long-
run differences in peer quality across schools (such as teacher quality, superior management 
style, or funding)
2. As such, if students benefit directly from higher-achieving classmates (Lavy, 
Silva, and Weinhardt 2012; Hoxby and Weingarth 2006; Hanushek et. al. 2003), part of the 
benefit to attending a selective school may be attributed to the direct benefits of having higher-
                                                            
1 I thank Stephanie Riegg Cellini, David Deming, Ron Ehrenberg, David Figlio, Caroline Hoxby, Brian Jacob, 
Jordan Matsudaira, Jonah Rockoff, and Miguel Urquiola for helpful comments on early drafts of this paper. 
2 Jackson (2009) presents evidence that teacher quality is determined in part by student characteristics. 2 
 
achieving peers. If the high concentrations of high-achieving students afforded by selective 
schools engenders an environment particularly conducive to learning, then adopting the practices 
of selective schools (such as strict discipline and educated teachers) in other schools will not 
yield similarly impressive results. Without knowing how much of the benefits associated with 
successful selective schools is due to those schools providing higher-achieving peers, we will 
have little indication of whether successful school models can be replicated in other settings.   
  I aim to shed new light on this issue by investigating the extent to which the positive 
selective school effects documented in Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson 2010) can be attributed to 
selective schools providing higher-achieving contemporaneous peers.
3 This poses empirical 
difficulties because; (a) school selectivity and peer quality generally move together, (b) students 
select to schools, and (c) students select to peers. However, peculiarities of the Trinidad and 
Tobago education system provide a rare opportunity to overcome these difficulties. 
  To address concerns that peer quality and input quality tend to move together, I identify 
the effects of attending a selective school (a school with higher-achieving peers) using variation 
across schools, and I identify the direct effect of exposure to higher-achieving peers using only 
variation in peer achievement across cohorts within schools ─ effectively holding input quality 
constant.
4 I present an analytical framework that shows under certain conditions, the marginal 
effect of higher achieving peers obtained within schools divided by the marginal effect of higher 
achieving peers obtained across schools will yield the fraction of the school selectivity effect that 
can be directly attributed to that school providing higher achieving peers.   
  To address concerns that students may self-select to schools and peers, I restrict analysis 
to a sub-sample where students are assigned to schools by the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
based on observable characteristics that I can control for directly ─ precluding self-selection to 
one's assigned school or assigned peers. I use the assignments to construct instruments for (a) the 
selectivity of the schools that students attend and (b) changes in the incoming achievement of 
peers across cohorts within schools. I present tests indicating that (a) school assignments are 
conditionally exogenous, and (b) changes in assigned peer quality across cohorts within schools 
are conditionally exogenous. One remaining concern is that changes in peer achievement within 
                                                            
3 This paper does not investigate the broader related question of how much school value-added can be explained by 
peer quality. This would be very ambitious research to undertake. The data available and the nature of the 
exogenous variation preclude a rigorous treatment of this broader question.    
4 Similar approaches to identifying direct peer effects are used in Ammermueller and Pischke (2006), Lavy and 
Schlosser (2009), Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), and Hanushek, et al. (2003). 3 
 
schools across cohorts could be correlated with changes in unobserved school inputs. This is 
unlikely because the schools used are centrally operated by the MOE that rarely alters school 
policies, spending, or inputs on a school-by-school basis. Moreover, I show that changes in 
assigned peer quality over time within schools are unrelated to changes a school's desirability (a 
measure of perceived long-run school quality) or observed teacher quality. 
  I use the number of secondary school-leaving exams passed at the end of 10
th grade as the 
main outcome. This variable is a summary statistic for overall educational attainment because it 
is sensitive to dropping out of school, the number of exams attempted, and performance on a 
given exam. Echoing findings of Jackson (2010), attending schools with higher incoming peer 
achievement increases the number of exams passed. Also, increases in mean peer achievement 
within schools increase the number of exams passed. The marginal effect of increases in mean 
peer achievement across schools is about 10 times larger than the marginal effect of increases in 
mean peer achievement across cohorts within schools ─ implying that approximately 1/10 = 10 
percent of the selective schooling effect can be attributed to the achievement level of peers. 
However, the direct marginal effect of peers varies considerably across schools such that peer 
achievement can account for two-thirds of the school selectivity effect among the most selective 
schools, but explains little of the effect for the lower three quartiles of schools. Four additional 
empirical facts support the notion that a sizable part of the selective school effect is a peer effect: 
(1) among high-achieving schools, both the benefits to attending a more selective school and the 
benefits of increased peer achievement within schools are large; (2) among low-achieving 
schools both the benefits to attending a school with higher-achieving peers and benefits of 
increased peer achievement within schools are small; (3) females, who benefit more from 
attending selective schools also enjoy the largest benefits to marginal increases in peer 
achievement within schools, and (4) gender differences in the response to peers can completely 
explain gender differences in response to schools.  
   In this paper, I present a framework within which one can determine how much of a 
school selectivity effect is directly attributable to a peer achievement effect. Using this 
framework, this paper is the first paper to show that, among the most selective schools, much of 
the school selectivity effect can be directly attributed to the incoming achievement level of the 
peers ─ such that the successes at the most selective schools may not be scalable. Conversely, I 
show that incoming peer achievement can only explain a small fraction of the school selectivity 4 
 
effect on average, so that school attributes that generate the large differences in value-added 
between low- and middle-achieving schools are potentially scalable.  
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the Trinidad and 
Tobago education system and the data. Section III lays out the analytic framework. Section IV 
outlines the empirical strategy. Section V presents results, specification tests, and robustness 
checks. Section VI concludes. 
 
II   The Trinidad and Tobago Education System and the Data. 
In Trinidad and Tobago secondary school begins in first form (6
th grade) and ends at fifth 
form (10
th grade) when students take the Caribbean Secondary Education Certification (CSEC) 
examinations. The exams are given in 31 subjects and are externally graded. Students who pass 
five or more subjects including English language and mathematics exams meet the requirements 
for secondary school graduation.
5 There are eight public school districts, and private schools 
account for a small share of student enrollment and tend to serve those who “fall through the 
cracks” in the public system.
6 There are two types of public secondary schools: Government 
schools, and Government Assisted schools (Assisted schools). Government schools provide 
instruction from 6
th through 10
th grade and often continue to 12
th grade. These schools teach the 
national curriculum and are fully funded and operated by the Government. Assisted schools are 
almost identical to government schools but differ along the following key dimensions; (a) 
Assisted schools are run by religious boards and are often single-sex schools; (b) all operating 
expenses except teacher costs are publicly funded; (c) while the MOE assigns students to fill all 
available slots at Government schools, the MOE assigns students to 80 percent of the open slots 
at Assisted schools. The remaining 20 percent of school slots at Assisted schools are assigned by 
the principal. This last distinction is key because unlike assignment to Assisted schools, 
assignment to government schools is not subject to self-selection bias.  
 
II.1.  Data and Summary Statistics: The data used in this study come from two sources: the 
official SEA test score data (5
th grade) for the 1995 through 2002 cohorts and the official 2000 
                                                            
5 The CSEC examinations are accepted as an entry qualification for higher education in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Students may continue to take the Caribbean Advanced Proficiency Examinations 
at the end of grade 12, which is a prerequisite for more selective colleges and universities in most nations.  
6 Students at private secondary schools have SEA scores 0.33 standard deviations below the average. 5 
 
through 2007 CSEC test score data (10
th grade). The SEA data contain each of the nation's 
student’s SEA test scores, their list of preferred secondary schools, their gender, age, religion 
code, primary school district, and the secondary school to which they were assigned by the 
MOE. The SEA exam is comprised of five subjects that all students take: math, English, science, 
social studies, and an essay. To track these 5
th grade students through to secondary school, I link 
the SEA data with the CSEC examination data both four and five years later. About 72 percent of 
SEA test takers were linked to CSEC exam data.
7 The CSEC data contain each student's grades 
on each CSEC exam and the secondary school they attended. In the data, there are 123 public 
secondary schools, some small test-taking centers and private schools. Among students linked to 
CSEC data, under seven percent attended a private institution, were home schooled, or were 
unaffiliated with any public education institution. To ensure that I have a sample within which 
the school assignments are not subject to any selection, I drop students who are assigned to 
Assisted schools and private schools. The resulting analytical dataset contains 150,701 students 
across seven cohorts and 158 school assignments.
8  
Table 1 summarizes the final dataset, broken up by the assigned secondary schools’ 
rankings in incoming SEA scores (i.e. the school with the highest average incoming total SEA 
scores is ranked first). SEA scores are in standard deviation units. Females make up about half of 
students in each school group. There is much variation in school and peer quality. The 30 most 
selective schools had students with about one standard deviation higher incoming SEA scores 
than schools ranked between 31 and 90, which in turn had students with average incoming scores 
over half a standard deviation higher than schools ranked below 90. As expected, selective 
schools have better outcomes. About 87 percent of students at schools ranked better than 30 took 
the CSEC exams compared to 71 percent for schools ranked 31 to 90, and 59 percent for schools 
ranked below 90. The average student at a top 30 school passes 4.44 exams, compared to 1.9 
exams in schools ranked between 31 and 90, and passing only 1 exam at schools ranked below 
90. Some of these differences are due to students not taking the CSEC exams having no passes.  
The schools that attract the brightest students typically have the best school resources. 
                                                            
7 Students were matched on name, gender, and date of birth. The match rate is consistent with the national dropout 
rate of one third. Students with missing outcomes are coded as having zero passes and included in the sample.  
8There are more assignments than high schools because some when there are more students than available spots, the 
government assigns students with the lowest SEA scores to small "temporary" schools or purchases seats in private 
schools. Omitting students assigned to such schools does not affect the results.  
 6 
 
Schools with the highest achieving students are on average smaller with cohort sizes being about 
120 students at the top 30 schools and about 440 students in both other groups of schools. 
Similarly, about 58 percent of teachers at schools ranked better than 30 have a bachelors degree 
compared to 55 percent for schools ranked 31 to 90, and 36 percent for schools ranked below 90. 
Given that having a university or college degree likely has an important effect on teaching 
ability, this may translate into sizable teacher quality differences across schools. Higher ranked 
schools also have fewer inexperienced teachers. Specifically, 14 percent of teachers at schools 
ranked better than 30 have between 0 and 3 years of teaching experience compared to 16 percent 
for schools ranked 31 to 90, and 24 percent for schools ranked below 90.    
 
III Econometric  Framework 
  I present a model showing that, under reasonable assumptions, the ratio of the coefficient 
on peer quality obtained using variation across schools and the coefficient on peer quality 
obtained using variation within-schools across cohorts yields an estimate of the proportion of the 
effect of attending a school with higher-achieving peers that can be directly attributed to 
contemporaneous exposure to higher-achieving peers. The within-school peer effects will reflect 
direct peer interactions, contextual effects, and teacher and parent interactions that may all be 
directly affected by the contemporaneous classroom composition and not scalable across schools.   
  Input quality at school j at time t, denoted Ijt, is a linear function of permanent (long-run) 
peer quality  j P and idiosyncratic determinants ujt. This is written as [1] below. 
[1]          where   E[ | ] E[ ] 0 jj jt jt jt jt IP u u P u     . 
This captures the fact that school inputs (such as teacher quality and alumni donations) are 
endogenous to persistent characteristics of the student body. Input quality is not a function of 
contemporaneous peer quality because input quality changes are likely not sensitive to transitory 
shocks to peer quality and changes. I present empirical support of this assumption in section V.2.  
  Peer quality is comprised of long-run component  j P and idiosyncratic component  jt  .  
[2]           where   E[ | , ] E[ ] 0 jj jt jt jt jt jt PP P u      . 
The long-run component plus random error captures the fact that the schools that attract the 
highest/lowest achieving students have done so for years. This modeling assumption is akin to 
saying that Harvard and Yale (or Oxford and Cambridge) always attract the top students in any 7 
 
given year. I present empirical support of this assumption in section V.2.  
  Achievement of student i at school j at time t  ijt Y  is a separable function of input quality 
and peer quality as in [3] below, where  ijt   is an idiosyncratic error term.  
[3]       where  E[ | , ] [ ] 0 ijt jt jt ijt ijt jt jt ijt YP I P I E         . 
  Substituting [1] into [3], the expected difference in student outcomes across schools j and 
school j' conditional on peer quality is given by [4] below.  
[4]     '' ' ' ' ' [ | , ] () () ( ) () i j t i jt j t jt j t jt j t jt j t jt E YY P P PP I I PP          . 
Equation [4] illustrates that, under the identifying assumptions in [1],[2], and [3], differences in 
student achievement across schools associated with peer quality reflect the direct marginal effect 
of short-run variation in peers  plus the marginal effect of input quality differences across 
schools that exist in equilibrium as a result of long-run difference in peer quality .  
 Because  in expectation there are no systematic differences in input quality within schools 
over time, the expected difference in student outcomes across cohorts t and t-1, within school j 
conditional on peer quality is given by [5] below. 
[5]       '1 1 1 [| , , ] ( ) ijt i jt jt jt jt jt EY Y P P J j P P       . 
Equation 5 illustrates that comparing the outcomes of observationally similar students attending 
the same school but exposed to different peers because they attend at different times, yields the 
direct effect of peers on outcomes  . As such, /( )     , the coefficient on within-school 
changes in peer quality divided by the coefficient on peer quality obtained across schools, yields 
the fraction of the benefits to attending a selective school that can be directly attributed to 
exposure to higher achieving peers. Because the assumptions of linearity and the additive 
separability are restrictive, I also present findings where these assumptions are somewhat 
relaxed. I now detail strategies to uncover consistent estimates of both   and    . 
 
IV Empirical  Strategy 
Estimating the effect of attending a more selective school 
  To estimate the effect of attending a school with higher-achieving peers,    , the 
basic approach is to compare the outcomes of observationally similar students at different 
schools. For the naïve baseline specification, I model the outcome of student i at a school j in 8 
 
cohort c with the following equation. 
 [6]      () ( ) ijc ijc i c ijc Yf S E A S E A           
where  () i f SEA is a function if a student's incoming SEA score,  ijc SEA is the mean incoming SEA 
score of all other students at school j in cohort c with student i,  c  is a cohort fixed effect and  ijc 
is unobserved determinants of student achievement. Because students may select to schools 
based on unobserved determinants of achievement, naïve estimation of [6] might not uncover the 
parameter  ()    . This motivates an instrumental variables strategy that uses students' initial 
school assignments by the MOE to remove bias due to student selection to schools. 
Estimating the direct effect of contemporaneous peer achievement 
  To estimate the effect of contemporaneous exposure to higher-achieving peers,  , I 
compare outcomes of observationally similar students at the same school but who are exposed to 
peers with different levels of incoming achievement because they are in different cohorts.  In the 
naïve specification, I model the outcome of student i at a school j in cohort c with [7]. 
 [7]      () ijc ijc i c j ijc Yf S E A S E A        . 
All variable are defined as in [6]. The difference between [6] and [7] is the inclusion of a school 
fixed effect  j  , that absorbs time-invariant variation in peer quality ─  so that estimation is based 
on only idiosyncratic transitory variation in peer quality within schools across cohorts. This same 
strategy has successfully been employed in several papers including Ammermueller and Pischke 
(2006), Lavy and Schlosser (2009), and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006).  However, because (a) 
students may select to schools based on unobserved determinants of achievement and this 
selection may change over time, and (b) mean peer achievement could change within schools for 
reasons other than random transitory shocks, naïve estimation of [7] by OLS may not uncover 
.  This motivates an instrumental variables strategy that uses students' initial school assignments, 
and the initial school assignments of students' peers, to remove bias due to student selection to 
schools and bias due to endogenous changes in peer achievement over time. 
 
IV.2  Student Assignment Rules:  
  After 5
th grade, all students take the SEA examinations. Each student lists four ordered 
secondary school choices. These choices and the SEA scores are used by the MOE to assign 9 
 
students to schools. School slots are assigned in successive rounds such that the most highly 
subscribed/ranked school fills its spots first, then the next highly subscribed school fills its slots 
in the second round, and so on until all school slots are filled. This is done as follows: (1) The 
number of school slots at each school nj is predetermined based on capacity. (2) Students are 
tentatively placed in the applicant pools for their first choice schools and are ranked in 
descending order by SEA score within each application pool. (3) The school at which the nj
th 
ranked applicant has the highest SEA score is deemed the most highly subscribed/ranked school 
j1, this score is the cut-off score for this school, and the top nj1 students in the applicant pool for 
top-ranked school j1 are admitted to school j1. (4) The top ranked school's slots and the admitted 
students are removed from the pool, and the second choice becomes the new "first choice" for 
students who had the top ranked school as their first choice but did not gain admission. (5) This 
process is repeated in round two to assign students to the second highest ranked school j2 and 
determine the cut-off score for the second ranked school. This is repeated in subsequent rounds 
until all slots are filled. This process applies to over 95% of students. However, assisted schools 
(16% of school slots) can admit 20% of their incoming class at the principal’s discretion. The 
rule is used to assign 80% of the students at these schools, while the remaining 20% can be hand-
picked by the principal before the next-highest ranked school fills any of its slots.
9  
The actual cut-off scores for each school are not released to the public. However, because 
the rules are known, and I have the same information that the MOE used to assign students, I can 
simulate where the cut-offs would have been if Assisted schools could not hand pick students 
(see Appendix Note 1). After simulating clean cut-offs, I estimated the likelihood of attending 
one's top choice school as a function of one's score relative to the simulated cut-off for one's top 
choice school. Figure 1 depicts a sudden increase in the likelihood of assignment to one's top 
choice school as one's score goes from below to above the simulated cut off ─ indicating that (a) 
the assignments operate as described, and (b) there are meaningful differences in school 
assignments associated with scoring above/below a cut-off that are not due to selection. The fact 
that assignments to government schools are orthogonal to unobserved student characteristics 
(where both choices and SEA scores are observed) plays a crucial role for identification, and 
motivates my using only those students with exogenous assignments to government schools.    
                                                            
9 These hand-picked students are chosen based on family alumni connections, being relatives of teachers, or religion. 
These students need not list the school as their top choice. Students receive one assignment and are never made 
aware of other schools they would have been assigned to had they not been hand-picked. 10 
 
In general, students tend to put schools with higher-achieving peers higher up on their 
preference ranking. On average, the difference between the mean incoming SEA scores at a 
student’s top choice school and second, third and fourth choice school is 0.277, 0.531, and 0.91  
standard deviations, respectively. Also, higher-achieving students tend to have more selective 
schools in their list, students request schools with the same religious affiliation as their own, and 
students typically list schools geographically close to home. Because school choices are a 
summary statistic for student/parental aspirations, preferences, expectations about ability, 
religious affiliation, and geographic location makes these choices a powerful set of controls.  
 
Identification Strategy 
  Because students assigned to government schools cannot self-select into the assignment, 
conditional on incoming test scores and student choices, the school assignments within the group 
of government schools is exogenous. I detail how I exploit this fact to identify (a) the effect of 
attending a selective secondary school, and (b) the effect of marginal increases in incoming peer 
achievement within a school. 
Using instruments to estimate the effect of attending a more selective school 
  The problem with merely comparing outcomes of observationally similar students who 
attend different schools (as in [6]) is that students may select or transfer into selective schools 
based on unobserved characteristics that directly affect student outcomes. As such, one needs 
variation in school attendance that is beyond students' control. Conditional on school choices, the 
assignment rule creates test score cut-offs above which students are assigned to one school and 
below which they are assigned to another. Among students who chose a selective school, the 
likelihood of being assigned to (and attending) a more selective  school increases in a sudden and 
discontinuous manner as one's score goes from below to above the cut-off for that selective 
school. If the locations of the cut-offs are orthogonal to student characteristics, and the effect of 
test scores on outcomes is smooth through the cut-offs, one can attribute any sudden jumps in 
outcomes as one's score goes from below to above the cut-offs to the sudden exogenous 
increased likelihood of attending a selective school. While this variation is amenable a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design, relatively small sample sizes preclude precise estimates using 
such a design. However, the main findings are robust to using this discontinuity variation. 11 
 
  I follow Jackson (2010; 2012) and exploit a different source of exogenous variation 
created by the assignment rules. This second source of exogenous variation comes from the fact 
that different schools have different cut-offs so that students with the same test scores but 
different choices are assigned to different schools. This variation is best illustrated with an 
example. Consider a world with two similarly selective schools 1 and 2 (both with mean peer 
quality of 0.5) and one average school 3 (with mean peer quality of 0). There are two choice 
groups; choice group 1 who list school 1 as their top choice and school 3 as their second; and 
choice group 2 who list school 2 as their top choice and school 3 as their second choice. 
Applicants to school 1 scoring above 82 on the SEA are admitted, while school 2 has a higher 
cut-off such that applicants to school 2 scoring above 92 are admitted. One can put all students 
into one of three test score groups: group A with scores of 82 and below; group B with scores 
between 83 and 92; and group C with scores of 93 and above. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
  Students in test score group A (with scores below the cut-offs for both selective schools) 
are never admitted to a selective school whether they are in choice group 1 or choice group 2. 
Similarly, students in test score group C (with scores above the cut-offs for both selective 
schools) are all admitted to a selective school whether they are in choice group 1 or choice group 
2. However, those in test score group B (with scores above the cut-off for school 1 but below the 
cutoff for school 2) who are in choice group 1 are admitted to a selective school while those in 
choice group 2 are not admitted to a selective school. As such, if the choice group effects are 
additively separable from that of test scores, one can use a difference in difference approach to 
identify the effect of attending a selective school. 
  Because the difference in choices do not lead to a difference in selective school 
attendance within test score groups A and C, the difference in outcomes between choice groups 1 
and 2 within test score groups A and C cannot be due to differences in test scores or differences 
in selective school attendance and must therefore be due to differences in choices. However, 
because the difference in choices lead to a differences in selective school attendance within test 
score range B, the difference in outcomes between choice groups 1 and 2 within test score group 
B reflects both differences in selective school attendance (in this example a mean peer 
achievement difference of 0.5 standard deviations) and differences in choices. The difference in 
outcomes between choice groups 1 and 2 within test score group B (selective effect + choice 12 
 
group effect), minus the difference in outcomes between choice groups 1 and 2 within test score 
groups A or C (choice group effect), reflects the effect of attending a more selective school. 
  To capture the difference in difference (DID) variation due only to the assignment rules, I 
use assigned peer quality (i.e. the average incoming test scores of other students assigned to the 
same school j* as student i in cohort c),  
* ij c SEA , as an instrument for actual peer quality while 
controlling for a full set of choice indicator variables, and a full set of SEA score indicator 
variables. Specifically, I estimate the outcome of student i from cohort c, at school j with the 
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In [8],  
ijc SEA  is the mean total SEA scores for students attending the same school j as student i in 
cohort c, 
i SEA k I   is an indicator variable equal to one if the student's SEA score is in test score bin 
k (because SEA scores are continuous, SEA scores are put into 50 narrow bins per) so that  2 k   is 
effectively a test score fixed effect,  i Pp I  is an indicator variable denoting whether a student has a 
particular school preference ordering (choices), and  ,2 p  is a preference ordering (choices) fixed 
effect (i.e. there is an indicator variable denoting each distinct ordered list of schools. For 
example there is a dummy variable for all students who list schools A,B,C,D as their first, 
second, third and fourth choice schools, and another different indicator variable for all students 
who list A,B,D,C as their first, second, third and fourth choice schools.),  i X  includes student 
gender,  c   is a SEA test taking cohort fixed effect, and ijc  is the idiosyncratic error term.  
  The 2SLS estimate of the coefficient on peer achievement,   , from [8] should be 
unbiased since (1) the analytic sample only includes those schools and students for whom the 
initial school assignment is exogenous conditional on incoming test scores and choices, (2) the 
excluded instrument, mean peer quality of the students assigned school (based on other students 
assigned to the school), is not affected by students subsequently transferring to schools they 
prefer, and (3) inference is based on comparisons within groups of students who are similar in 
important ways  but who were assigned to different schools for reasons beyond their control. 13 
 
  While there is no way to test for a correlation between the instruments and unobserved 
student characteristics, I present evidence consistent with the identifying assumption by showing 
that observed covariates are uncorrelated with the instruments. Specifically, I run a regression 
with SEA score fixed effects choice fixed effects and the assigned peer quality to predict each 
religion indicator variable, each primary school district indicator variable, and the number of 
times a student attempted the SEA exams. I present the estimated coefficient on mean total in 
Table 2. Assigned peer quality is not associated with student religion, the number of SEA 
attempts, or the students' primary school district at the five percent level — suggesting that the 
conditional exogeneity assumption is valid. I present further robustness checks in Section V.2. 
Using Instruments to Estimate the effect of improved peer quality within schools 
  The problem with simply comparing the outcomes of observationally similar students at 
the same school exposed to different levels peers is that (a) students select to schools and (b) 
peers select to schools. To address this problem, I use variation in peer quality that is not subject 
to student or peer selection. The fact that students assigned to government schools cannot self-
select into their assignment allows this. I use across-cohort within-school changes in average 
incoming test scores of other students assigned to the same assigned school as an instrument for 
changes in actual peer quality within students actual schools. To do this, I augment the cross-
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The difference between [9] above and the naïve model [7] is that I include fixed effects for the 
student’s assigned secondary school (as opposed to the actual school) and I instrument for the 
actual peers at the actual school with the assigned peers at the assigned school. As long as the 
school assignments are exogenous, conditional on test scores and student choices, equation [9] 
will remove bias due to selection of students and peers and will yield an unbiased estimate of .  
I present evidence consistent with the identifying assumptions of no selection by showing 
that observed covariates are uncorrelated with changes in assigned peers within assigned schools 
across cohorts. Specifically, I run a regression with SEA score fixed effects, choice fixed effects, 
assigned school fixed effects, and the assigned peer quality to predict each religion indicator 14 
 
variable, each primary school district indicator variable, and the number of times a student 
attempted the SEA exams. I present the estimated coefficient on mean total in Table 2. Assigned 
peer quality is not associated with student religion, the number of SEA attempts, or the students' 
primary school district at the five percent level — suggesting that the conditional exogeneity 
assumption is valid. While this strategy may remove selection bias, there remains the concern 
that changes in peer achievement could be correlated with changes in unobserved school inputs. 
In section V.2, I present evidence that this is not the case.  
There are two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in mean peer achieving within 
schools over time. Because there are only about 20 thousand students taking the SEA each year 
and schools take small slices (between 100 and 500 students) out of the SEA distribution based 
largely on student rank, both small transitory changes in the distribution of test scores and 
idiosyncratic variation in the distribution of student preferences over time lead to meaningful 
exogenous variation in assigned peer achievement within assigned schools across cohorts.  
To illustrate this variation due only to small changes the SEA distribution, I look at mean 
SEA scores for students ranked 1 to 100, students ranked 3000 to 3500, and 10000 to 10500 for 
each year between 1995 and 1998. Figures 3 and 4 show that due to small changes in the 
distribution of test scores, the average incoming test scores of students ranked 1 to 100 decreased 
by 0.1σ between 1995 and 1996 and increased by 0.06σ between 1996 and 1997. In comparison, 
mean test scores of students ranked 10000 to 10500 increased by 0.05σ between 1995 and 1996 
and fell by 0.02σ between 1996 and 1997. Within district changes are even larger. Mean test 
scores of the top 100 students in the largest district increased by 0.21σ between 1995 and 1996, 
while the mean test scores of students ranked between 2000 and 2500 fell by 0.11σ.
10  
  The second source of variation is due to year to year changes in student preferences. 
Because the assignment mechanism fills schools sequentially and a school’s order is based on the 
score of the last admitted student, small changes in preferences, demographics, and scores can 
cause a school that fills its slots first in one year to be second or third the following year. As 
such, small perturbations in the distribution of student choices and test scores play out into 
meaningful differences in peer quality within schools over time. This source of variation would 
                                                            
10 Because schools must fill a fixed number of school slots every year there is no correlation between peer quality 
changes and cohort size within a school over time. The null hypothesis that within-school changes in assigned mean 
peer quality are not correlated with within school changes in cohort size yields a p-value of  0.65.  
 15 
 
be problematic if changes in student choices were correlated changes in unobserved school 
characteristics. I present empirical evidence that this is not the case in Section V.2. 
 
V Results 
Main Results: Table 3 presents the cross-school and within-school estimates for the full analytic 
sample. The top panel presents naive OLS results based on students' actual schools attended, the 
second panel presents reduced forms (RF) effect of assigned peer quality on students' outcomes, 
and the third panel presents the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates that use assigned peer 
quality as an exogenous predictor of actual peer quality. Columns 1 through 3 present the across 
school models, while columns 4 through 7 present the within school models.  
A parsimonious OLS model of the number of exams passed as a function of the mean 
total scores of the students at the actual school, SEA cohort fixed effects, the student's gender, 
and a cubic in the total SEA score (column 1 top panel) yields an across school coefficient of 
1.044 (se = 0.082). Controlling for student choices (column 2) and including indicator variables 
for 50 SEA test score groups (column 3) yield very similar estimates of 1.229 (se = 0.073) and 
1.235 (se = 0.073), respectively. These OLS results indicate that a student who attends a school 
where peer test scores 0.2 standard deviations higher (roughly the within-school variance in peer 
quality) would pass about 0.244 more exams. These findings echo Jackson (2010).  
The second panel presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to a school with 
higher achieving peers that should be free from self-selection bias. The reduced form estimates 
range between 0.437 and 0.574 and are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
instrumental variables results in the third panel (row) are similar to the OLS results yielding 
statistically significant coefficient estimates between 0.85 and 1.177 ─ indicating that after 
taking self-selection into account, a student who attends a school where peer test scores are 0.2 
standard deviations higher would pass between 0.17 and 0.23 more exams.   
Columns 4 through 7 present the within-school results that should identify the direct 
effect of peer achievement on outcomes. The OLS results are based on actual incoming peer 
achievement at students' actual schools attended and include indicator variables for students' 
actual school attended. The parsimonious model that includes SEA cohort fixed effects gender, a 
cubic of their total SEA score, and fixed effects for the actual school attended (column 4 top 
panel) yields a within-school coefficient of 0.14 (se = 0.067). Controlling for score group 16 
 
dummies (column 5), student choices (columns 6) and both score group dummies and choices 
(column 7) yield very similar within-school estimates of 0.144 (se = 0.067), 0.135 (se = 0.072) 
and 0.141 (se=0.074), respectively. These OLS results indicate that a student would pass about 
0.028 more exams than an observationally similar student who attends the same school when 
peer achievement was 0.2 standard deviations lower. The ratio of interest, the preferred across-
school OLS coefficient divided by the preferred within-school OLS coefficient is a statistically 
significant 0.114 (se = 0.58) ─ suggesting that roughly 11 percent of school selectivity effect can 
be attributed directly to peer quality differences across schools.
11   
The IV estimates are about half the size of the OLS estimates, suggesting that there is 
positive selection on unobservables to high achieving peers. The IV estimates are not statistically 
significant, and range between 0.069 and 0.085. Taken literally, the point estimates suggest that 
after taking self-selection bias into account, a student would pass between 0.014 and 0.017 more 
exams than an observationally similar student who attended the same school when peer 
achievement was 0.2 standard deviations lower. Note that the first stage F-statistics are all above 
100. The ratio of the preferred within-school and across-school IV estimates is 0.072 (se=0.122) 
─ suggesting that on average roughly 7.2 percent of school value-added can be attributed directly 
to peer quality differences across schools. The results in Table 3 suggest that most of the school 
selectivity effect, on average is not due to contemporaneous exposure to higher achieving peers, 
so that much of the differences across schools may be scalable on average. However, these 
average effects may mask considerable heterogeneity by gender and school type.  
 
Effects by gender: Recent findings indicate that girls are more likely to benefit from attending 
better schools than boys (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006; Deming, Hastings, et al. 2012). Also, 
using similar data, Jackson (2010) finds that the selectivity effect is larger for girls than for boys. 
A psychology literature suggests that females may be more responsive to peers than males (Cross 
and Madson 1997, Maccoby and Jacklin 1974, Eagly 1978).  As such, a differential gender 
response to schools might be due to a differential gender response to peers. Indeed recent papers 
find that while females benefit from exposure to higher achieving peers, males may not (e.g. 
Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 2010; Han and Li 2009).  
                                                            
11 The standard error of this ratio of coefficients was computed by estimating both the across school model and the 
within school models simultaneously (a two-equation model) and then computing the standard error of the nonlinear 
combination of coefficients using the delta method. This computation is dome by STATA's "nlcom" command. 17 
 
  To test for whether gender differences in response to peers can explain gender differences 
in response to schools, I present the preferred specifications with the inclusion of the interaction 
between being female and peer quality in Table 4. As such, the coefficient on mean peer scores 
is the effect for males, while the coefficient on the interaction between female and mean peer 
scores is the difference in the marginal effect for males and females. Columns 1 and 2 present the 
across school estimates. In the OLS model, both males and females benefit from attending 
schools with higher achieving peers and females benefit more than males. In the OLS model in 
column 1, the coefficient on peer scores is 0.931 (se=0.069) and that for the interaction between 
peer scores and female is 0.579 (se=0.068). The IV results tell a similar story. The point 
estimates in the preferred IV model (with preference and score group fixed effects) in column 2 
suggest that males and females who attend a school with 0.2 standard deviations higher peer test 
scores will pass 0.2 and 0.27 more exams, respectively. The effect for females is 38 percent 
larger than that for males, and the difference is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
  Columns 4 through 7 present the within school estimates of the direct effect of peers by 
gender. The OLS results suggest no direct peer effect for males and large peer effects for 
females. In the within-school OLS model (column 3), the coefficient on peer scores is -0.041 
(se=0.079) and that for the interaction between peer scores and female is 0.358 (se=0.073). This 
suggests that females who attend a school during a time when peer test scores are 0.2 standard 
deviations higher would pass 0.064 more exams while males would be unaffected. The within 
school IV results (columns 4) tells a similar story to the within school OLS results, but are 
noisier. The coefficient on mean peer quality is negative and not statistically significantly 
different from zero, while the coefficient on the interaction with female is positive and 
statistically significant at the five percent level. The IV coefficient on peer scores is -0.067 
(se=0.138) and that for the interaction between peer scores and female is 0.265 (se=0.134). 
While the direct effects are imprecisely estimated, they suggest that females who attend a school 
during a period when peer test scores are 0.2 standard deviations higher would pass 0.039 more 
exams while males would pass 0.0134 fewer exams.  
  The similarity between the gender differences across the cross-section and the within-
school models is notable. In the instrumental variables models, the gender difference in the 
school effect is 0.365 while that for the direct effect of peers is similar at 0.286. In fact, one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that peer effects account for all of the gender gap in response to 18 
 
schools at the 10 percent level.
12 The pattern of results suggest that much of the explanation for 
gender differences in response to schools (in this and other studies) has to do with females 
responding differently to their peers. Females who benefit more from exposure to higher 
achieving peers within the same school benefit more than males from attending schools with 
high-achieving peers, and the differential peer response may explain all of the differential 
response to schools ─ compelling evidence that between 6.67 and 6.67+14.4=21.1 percent of the 
school effect can be directly attributable to peers.
13 Also, the similarity of the gender differences 
in response to schools   , and the gender differences in response to peers , suggest that the 
assumption of additive separability of inputs and peer quality may be a good first approximation. 
 
Relaxing the Additive Separability and Linearity Assumptions: Because the decomposition for 
schools  on average may mask considerable heterogeneity by school selectivity, I relax the 
assumption that selectivity and peer effects are the same across all schools to a more flexible 
model that allows for non-linearity and non-additive separability.
14 I do this in two ways. First I 
present the instrumental variables results broken up by subsamples of similar schools by the level 
of peer incoming achievement. The second approach is to present flexible semi-parametric 
reduced form estimates of the effects of being assigned to schools with higher-achieving peers 
and the effects of increases in assigned peer achievement within assigned schools over time. 
These approaches allow one to see if peer quality plays a more important role for certain schools 
than others, and if the global estimates pertain to all schools.  
  Because peer quality and input quality are both higher at high-achieving schools, non-
linearity in the across-school effect could be due to (a) peer effects being non-linear, (b) the 
effect of other inputs being non-linear, or (c) complementarity of peer inputs and other inputs. In 
contrast, non-linearity in the within-school effects will reflect only (a) and (c). This implies that 
similarities in the non-linearity in across-school models and within-school models can provide 
further evidence of the importance of peers in explaining school effects. That is, if the across-
school effects (   ) are largest among schools for which the within-school effects ( ) are 
                                                            
12 The difference between the cross-school difference and the within-school gender difference is 0.08. The standard 
errors on the across school and within school gender differences are 0.12 and 0.07, respectively.   
13 These numbers are calculated from the fraction of the school effect attributable to peers by gender from Table 5. 
14 Because linearity and additive separability are approximated locally by the first order terms of a Taylor expansion 
of a continuously differentiable function, one can represent global non-linearity and non-separability by piecewise 
linear functions applied to different regions of the data. 19 
 
largest and vice versa, it would imply that direct peer effects are an important component of the 
school selectivity effect. I show this below.   
  The top panel of Table 5 presents the across-school estimates and the second panel 
presents the within school-estimates. Within each panel, the top row shows the reduced form 
results and the second row presents the instrumental variables results. In columns 1,2, and 3, I 
present linear peer effect estimates for different subsamples of schools based on rank (while 
controlling for gender, choices, and SEA score). Both the RF and IV estimates suggest that 
attending a school with marginally higher-achieving peers has a larger positive effect among 
schools with high-achieving peers. The IV across school coefficient on mean peer achievement is 
2.526 for the top 30 schools, 0.826 for schools ranked 31 through 90, and 0.542 for the bottom 
68 schools (all effects are significant at the 1 percent level).  
  The lower panel of Table 5 presents within-school estimates of the direct contribution of 
peers for the same groups of schools. All models include assigned school fixed effects, and 
controls for choices, gender and SEA score.
15 The IV within-school coefficient on mean peer 
achievement is 1.959 for the top 30 schools (p-value= 0.015), and is statistically insignificant and 
small for schools ranked below 30. In words, while increases in peer quality have little or no 
effect in most schools, increases in peer quality have a large positive effect on achievement 
among the most selective schools.
16 The fact that the non-linearity in the school effects track 
closely the non-linearity in the direct peer effect suggests that among the top 30 schools, some of 
the increased value-added can be attributed to the direct contribution of peers on outcomes. 
Consistent with this interpretation, based on the IV results,  /( )     , the fraction of the 
across school effect explained by direct peer influences is 0.78 (p-value=0.03) in the top 30 
schools, and is not statistically distinguishable from zero at other schools. 
To ensure that these effects are driven by heterogeneity by school selectivity and not 
heterogeneity in student achievement, I estimate the within-school model among students with 
different levels of incoming test scores (pooling all schools). Columns 4 through 7 present the 
results broken up by quartile of the student in incoming SEA scores. None of the within-school 
models yield results that are close to statistical significance and the pattern of point estimates are 
                                                            
15 For increased efficiency, I also include interactions of incoming test scores and cohort indicator variables with 
gender ─ this has little effect on the point estimates but does reduce the size of the standard errors. 
16 While not present in here results by gender yield a similar pattern, however the marginal benefits of peers are 
always higher for females than for males. 20 
 
not consistent with the results in columns 1 through 3 ─ suggesting that response heterogeneity 
by student ability does not drive the non-linear peer effects. 
To provide visual evidence of the nonlinear school selectivity effects, the left panel of 
Figure 5 shows the local polynomial fit of the number of exams passed (after taking out the 
effects of own incoming test scores, choices and gender) on the mean assigned peer level of the 
assigned school (this is a semi-parametric representation of the reduced form). Between -2 and 0, 
there are small increases in the number of examinations passed, however among schools with 
assigned peer achievement above 0, there are large benefits to attending a school with higher-
achieving peers ─ consistent Table 5. On the right panel of Figure 5, I show the relationship 
between the within-school effect of increases in assigned peer achievement over time and the 
mean peer achievement of the school. Specifically, I estimate the reduced form within-school 
model for each school βj, and then fit a local polynomial of the estimated βjs to the mean 
assigned peer achievement level of the school. The marginal effect of within school increases in 
peer quality is highest among high-achievement schools ─ consistent with the regression 
evidence. Figure 5 suggests that non-linearity in the selectivity effects are driven, in part, by non-
linearity in the within-school effects ─ evidence that direct peer effects are responsible for much 
of the large selectivity effects among selective schools but do not explain selectivity effects for 
middle- and low-achievement schools.  
  While the objective of this paper is to establish how much of the benefits to attending a 
selective school can be directly attributed to the quality of the peers at the school, it is helpful to 
discuss the policy implications behind the documented non-linear peer effects. Because peer 
quality and input quality are both higher at high-achieving schools, the non-linearity of the direct 
peer effects either reflect that marginal increases in peer quality within a school are more 
effective when peer achievement is already high, or that marginal increases in peer quality within 
a school are most effective when input quality is high. Because I do not observe input quality I 
am unable to distinguish these two scenarios. This distinction does not affect the interpretation of 
the ratio  /( )     , but it does have direct implications for how improvements in input quality 
(or peer quality) may increase school effectiveness. If the non-linearity in the within-school 
effect is driven by non-linearity in the marginal effect of peers, it would imply that school value-
added can be increased by increasing input quality at all schools (and the distribution of inputs 
across schools would only have distributional effects). It would also imply that one could 21 
 
increase overall achievement by stratifying students across schools by ability. However, if the 
non-linearity in the direct peer effect reflects complementarity between peer quality and other 
inputs, it would imply that the marginal effect of improved inputs will be highest at schools with 
the highest achieving students. It would also imply that overall education output would be 
highest if high ability students attend schools with the best inputs. Despite clear policy 
implications, data limitations preclude rigorous investigation into the source of the non-linearity. 
   
Intensive or Extensive Margin?: While the number of exams passed is a good measure of overall 
academic achievement, one may wonder if these effects are driven by students being less likely 
to drop out at schools that have higher achieving peers or due to improvements in outcomes 
conditional on taking the CSEC exams. To get a sense of this, I re-estimate the main preferred 
specifications using "taking the CSEC exams" as the dependent variable. In the cross-school 
model the IV estimate is small and not statistically significant ─ indicating that most, if not all, 
of the cross-school effect was on the intensive margin, as found in Jackson (2010). Similarly, the 
within-school model of CSEC taking yields a very small statistically insignificant point estimate. 
Even at the top 30 schools where there are large positive effects on the number of exams passed, 
the coefficient on taking the CSEC exams is a small and statistically insignificant─ suggesting 
that much of the direct peer effect is on intensive margin.  
 
V.2   Robustness Checks 
  While there are a priori reasons to believe that the results presented reflect true causal 
effects, there remain lingering concerns. I present these concerns and address them in turn. 
(1)  The difference in difference variation may not be clean: Given that the source of the 
exogenous variation exploited in this paper is driven in part by the test score cut-offs, it is 
helpful to show that the main cross sectional results are robust to exploiting this discontinuity 
only, and not relying on explicit controls for school choices. To do this, I create three variables 
that denote whether a student scores above the simulated cut-off for their first second, and third, 
choice schools. I then use these three variables as instruments en lieu of the assigned peer 
quality. The results are presented in Table 6. In the first stage, scoring above the cut-off for the 
first, second and third choice schools are associated with attending school with peers with 0.033, 
0.056 and 0.076 standard deviations higher incoming test scores, respectively. The reduced form 22 
 
regression indicates that scoring above the cut-off for the first, second and third choice schools 
are associated with passing -0.003 (se=0.44), 0.052 (se=0.36) and 0.072 (0.033) more exams, 
respectively. Using these three variables as instruments yields a coefficient on mean peer quality 
of 0.867 (se=0.254) ─ similar to the estimates obtained in Table 3. As a formal test that the 
assigned peer quality yield similar results to the cut-off instruments, I include the assigned peer 
quality as an additional instrument. In such a model (column 5) the coefficient is 1.009 
(se=0.074), and the test of overidentifying restrictions yields a p-value of 0.79 ─ indicating that 
the instrumental variables results based on the DID variation in assigned peer quality are 
consistent with discontinuity based instruments that rely only on variation due to the cut-offs.
17  
(2)  The estimated peer effects may be spurious:  I argue that the gender differences in 
response to peers and the differences by the school rank reflect a true causal relationship. As a 
further test of the validity of the results, I implement a test similar to Jackson and Bruegmann 
(2009) and Lavy and Schlosser (2009) where I include the current peers (for which there should 
be a true treatment effect) and the peer quality of the preceding cohort and the following cohort 
(for which there should be little to no effect).  The estimates that include current peers and peer 
quality in the following and preceding cohorts are presented in Table 7. To test for gender 
differences I show the coefficient on current peers and peer quality in the following and 
preceding cohorts interacted with whether the student is female. For all models, one rejects the 
null hypothesis that the subsequent peers and the preceding peers are jointly statistically 
significant at the 20 percent level. However, similar to Tables 4 and 5, one can reject the null 
hypothesis that current peer quality has zero effect among the top 30 schools (column 1) and the 
null hypothesis that females and males have the same response to peers (column 4) at the 10 
percent level. While the p-value on the contemporaneous effects for these two models is below 
0.1, those for the joint significance of the lag and lead are above 0.7 for both models. If we take 
the conservative view that the effect on the lag reflects some underlying spurious association, 
then we could subtract that from the contemporaneous effect to obtain a conservative causal 
estimate. Doing this for the female interaction results in a conservative reduced form peer effect 
estimate of 0.085. This is about two thirds of the reduced form estimate obtained in the preferred 
model in Table 4 ─ suggesting that there is a true gender difference. The same calculation for the 
                                                            
17 Note that a test for balance indicates that all observable covariates (including selectivity of choices) are smooth 
through the simulated cut-off. 23 
 
top 30 schools yields a conservative reduced form current peer effect estimate of 0.99. This is 
about 70 percent of the within school reduced form coefficient in Table 5. This conservative 
estimate implies that 37 percent (as opposed to 78 percent) of the across school effect among the 
top quartile of schools can be attributed to peers. 
(3)  The peer effects may be driven by sampling variation: In difference in difference models 
there is always the concern that inference based on estimated effects could be biased by 
underlying serial correlation in the data. To asses this problem I follow an approach used by 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically I create placebo treatments by taking each 
school and rearranging the actual peer achievement values for a given cohort so that the actual 
peer achievement are not lined up with the corresponding outcome for that year. I estimate the 
placebo treatments based on 100 replications of this reshuffling. I compare the actual estimates 
to the distribution of placebo estimates. Since the gender differences and the positive effect of 
peers among the top 30 school are the estimates that are statistically significant, I test these two 
models. In both cases, none of the 100 replications yielded parameter estimates larger than the 
actual estimated coefficients, suggesting that the estimates obtained were not some artifact of the 
sample and would not have been obtained merely due to sampling variation.  
(4)  Changes in peer quality within schools could be correlated with changes in input 
quality within schools: Becuase more desirable schools attract higher-achieving students and 
therefore have brighter peers, one may worry that improvements in input quality at a particular 
school in a particular year may cause students to rank that school more highly in their preference 
lists generating a correlation between changes in input quality and changes in peer quality within 
a school over time. While I do not observe input quality directly, all scenarios where changes in 
inputs lead to changes in the peer quality and vice versa involve schools moving up or down the 
rankings in desirability and therefore peer quality. I can test for this possibility directly. To show 
that this is not a source of bias, I show that such changes in school rankings from the assignment 
mechanism essentially do not occur in these data. Table 8 shows the correlation between a 
school's rank in simulated cut-off scores across years. The correlation between a school's rank 
across any two adjacent years in the data is at least 0.98 and the correlation between a school's 
rank in 1995 and seven years later in 2002 is 0.96 ─ so that systematic changes in school 
rankings are not driving the variation in assigned peer achievement within schools over time. 
  As a more direct test, I test for a correlation between changes in mean assigned peer 24 
 
achievement and teacher quality (one of the most important school inputs). Specifically, I run 
regressions of mean teacher characteristics on the mean SEA score of students assigned to the 
school while including both cohort and school fixed effects. The results (Table 9) indicate no 
relationship between changes in peer quality and changes in teacher quality. Taken together the 
results show that changes in peer quality within schools are due to idiosyncratic shocks around a 
long-run mean that are not correlated with changes in other school inputs within schools.    
 
VI Conclusions 
There is a growing body of evidence based on credible research designs indicating that 
attending selective schools may improve student outcomes. However, we have little understand 
of why. Using a unique dataset from Trinidad and Tobago, I investigating the extent to which the 
positive selective school effects can be attributed to selective schools providing higher-achieving 
contemporaneous peers. Using a carefully selected group of students where there is no self-
selection of students to assigned schools or assigned peers, I attempt to overcome a variety of 
econometric obstacles to estimating credible school selectivity effects and direct peer effects on 
the same student population.  
Using instrumental variables strategies, I find that attending a school with higher-
achieving peers is associated with substantial improvements in academic outcomes. However, on 
average, improvements in incoming peer achievement within a school are associated with small, 
improvements. The point estimates suggest that, on average, between 7 and 14 percent of the 
school effect can be directly attributed to peer quality differences across schools. Echoing other 
studies, the marginal effects of attending a school with higher achieving peers are larger for 
females than for males. I find that the gender differences in response to peers can account for all 
of the gender differences in response to schools ─ evidence that part of the school effect can be 
explained by the direct contribution of peers. I also find substantial non-linearity in the effects. 
Similar to Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2008), the marginal effect of 
attending a more selective school is greatest among the most selective schools. Looking at the 
direct effect of peers, this non-linear school selectivity effect appears to be driven by the fact that 
the marginal effect of improvements in peer achievement within a school is largest at selective 
schools ─ further evidence that direct peer effects are responsible for some of the effect of 
attending schools with higher-achieving peers. The symmetry in the non-linearity leads me to 25 
 
conclude that that while direct peer effects may explain little of the benefits to attending a more 
selective school among the bottom three-quarters of schools, at least one-third of the benefits to 
attending a more selective school among the top quarter of schools can be attributed directly to 
the achievement level of the peers.  
  The finding that at least one-third of the estimated school selectivity effect can be directly 
explained by peer achievement for the top quartile of schools is sobering because it implies that 
very little of the large estimated success at these selective schools can be scaled up to all schools. 
These findings underscore the fact that identifying highly successful schools may not be 
informative about how to improve outcomes for the average school. However, the finding that 
peer achievement explains almost none of the benefits to attending a more selective school 
among the bottom three-quarters of schools suggest that the relative successes at average schools 
may be scalable to low-performing schools.  
  Owing to the uniqueness of the institutional setup in Trinidad and Tobago, this paper is 
the first to rely on independent exogenous variation in schools attended and peer quality on the 
same student population ─ allowing one to credibly decompose a school selectivity effect and 
estimate the extent to which positive selective school effects can be attributed to selective 
schools providing higher-achieving contemporaneous peers. The findings highlight the 
importance of understanding the mechanisms through which selective schools may improve 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1:   Summary Statistics 
   Rank of School in Mean incoming SEA scores 
Variable  1 to 30  31 through 90  Above 90 
Total SEA score  1.102  0.122  -0.561 
(0.333) (0.693)  (0.654) 
Female 0.490  0.499  0.505 
(0.500) (0.500)  (0.500) 
Take the CSEC Exams  0.871  0.706  0.586 
(0.335) (0.456)  (0.493) 
Number of Exams Passed  4.444  1.939  1.005 
(2.628) (2.308)  (1.746) 
Certificate 
a 0.508  0.128  0.037 
(0.500) (0.334)  (0.189) 
Cohort size  119.1  439.7  443.9 
(63.6) (218.5)  (241.9) 
% Teacher with BA  0.584  0.552  0.360 
(0.232) (0.197)  (0.248) 
% Teacher 0 to 3 yrs  0.137  0.162  0.240 
(0.093) (0.120)  (0.136) 
% Teachers 4 to 20 yrs  0.399  0.418  0.402 
(0.169) (0.111)  (0.113) 
% Teacher 20 plus  0.309  0.356  0.279 
(0.153) (0.188)  (0.145) 
Observations 17811  84746  48144 
a. Certificate is variable that is equal to 1 if the student passes five CSEC exams including 
English and Mathematics. 









Table 2:   Falsification Tests and Implied Bias 
Cross-Section Bias tests
Dependent Variable  Religions  SEA Attempts 
1 2 3 4 5 attempts
Mean Total  0.001  0 -0.005 0.009 -0.008 0.013
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007]+
Districts
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8
Mean Total  -0.003  -0.003 0.004 <0.00000 -0.002 -0.001  <0.0000 <0.0000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005 [0.000] [0.000]
Within-School Bias tests
Dependent Variable  Religions  SEA Attempts 
1 2 3 4 5 attempts
Mean Total  -0.004  <0.00000 0.019 -0.014 <0.0000 0.005
[0.005] [0.008] [0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012]
Districts
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8
Mean Total  0.004  0.008 -0.024 -0.007 0.004 -0.021  <0.0000 <0.0000
[0.007] [0.008] [0.018] [0.004]+ [0.013] [0.016 [0.000] [0.000]
Robust standard errors in brackets 















Table 3:  Main Results 
Effects on the Number of Exams Passed: Full Sample 
1  2  3  4 5 6 7  Ratio
b 
Cross sectional results  Within School results    
Actual (OLS)  1.044  1.229  1.235  0.14  0.144 0.135 0.141  0.114 
   [0.082]**  [0.073]**  [0.073]**     [0.067]* [0.067]* [0.072]* [0.074]*    [0.058]* 
Assigned (RF)  0.437  0.57  0.574  0.039 0.043 0.038 0.047  0.082 
   [0.062]**  [0.057]**  [0.057]**     [0.058] [0.059] [0.079] [0.079]      [0.077] 
Actual (2SLS)  0.851  1.171  1.177  0.07  0.076 0.069 0.085  0.072 
[0.124]** [0.094]** [0.092]**  [0.105]  [0.105] [0.144] [0.144]  [0.122] 
First stage F-Statistic  578.48  390.3  396.23     666.88  453.67  513.023  519.67       
Cohort Fixed Effect?  YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES  ‐ 
Preference Effects? 
a YES  YES  YES  YES  ‐ 
Score Group Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  ‐ 
School Fixed Effects?  YES YES YES YES  ‐ 
‐ 
Observations  150701  150695  150695  150701 150701 150695 150695  ‐ 
R-squared  0.39  0.62  0.62     0.41  0.42           ‐ 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the assigned school level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
a. note that preferences include gender so that all models with preference fixed effect are within both preference and gender. 
b. The estimate of β/(β+πδ) ─ the coefficient in column 7 divided by the coefficient in column 3. The standard error was computed 
by stacking the data to estimate both the within and across model simultaneously and then using the delta method. 
 
 
Table 4:  Testing for Gender Differences  
Effects on the Number of Exams Passed: Effects by Gender 
Across schools  Within schools 
OLS 2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
1 2  3  4 
Peer SEA scores  0.931  1.005  -0.041  -0.067 
[0.069]** [0.101]**  [0.079]  [0.138] 
Female*Peer SEA scores  0.579  0.365  0.358  0.265 
[0.068]** [0.121]**  [0.073]** [0.134]* 
Female Effect  1.509  1.37  0.317  0.198 
[se] [0.086]**  [0.116]** [0.081]**  [0.128] 
Cohort Fixed Effect?  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Choice Effects?   YES  YES  YES  YES 
Score Group Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES 
School Fixed Effects?  -  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 150695  150695    150695  150695 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the assigned 




Table 5:  Effect by School Selectivity 
Dependent Variable is the Number of Exams Passed 
Across School Variation 

























Reduced  form  2.701 0.453 0.313 1.308 0.466 0.228 0.028 
[0.366]** [0.081]** [0.075]** [0.142]** [0.075]** [0.088]**  [0.032] 
Mean  peer  scores  (2SLS) 2.526 0.826 0.543 2.457 1.046 0.526 0.079 
    [0.323]** [0.161]** [0.168]** [0.262]** [0.171]** [0.183]**  [0.058] 
Within School Variation 
Reduced form  1.186  -0.0165  0.047  <0.001  -0.092  -0.164  -0.06 
[0.563]* [0.099]  [0.118]  [0.245] [0.162] [0.121] [0.243] 
Mean peer scores (2SLS)  1.959  -0.163  0.078  0.084  -0.166  -0.329  -0.042 
[0.797]* [0.184]  [0.215]  [0.490] [0.292] [0.232] [0.087] 
Observations  17811 84740 48144 26454 50348 42249 27521 
Ratio  (2SLS)  0.78 -0.197  0.145 0.034 -0.16 -0.626  -0.537 
[se]  [0.33]* [0.225] [0.399] [0.200] [0.280] [0.492] [1.17] 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the assigned school level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
All models include preference ordering fixed effects, and control for the total SEA score, its quadratic and its 














Table 6:  Effects Using Discontinuity Variation Only 
2SLS Results using Scoring Above a Simulated Cut-off for a Preferred School as Instruments 












OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Mean Peer Score (actual) - - - 0.867  1.009
- -  -  [0.254]**  [0.074]** 
Above first choice cut-off  0.049  0.033  -0.003  -  - 
[0.021]* [0.016]*  [0.044]  -  - 
Above second choice cut-off  0.07  0.056  0.054  -  - 
[0.022]** [0.015]**  [0.033]+  -  - 
Above third choice cut-off  0.14  0.076  0.072  -  - 
[0.023]** [0.016]**  [0.033]*  -  - 
Polynomial order of Total  5  5  5  5  5 
Cohort fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Preference fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
P-value of J-Stat  -  -  -  0.63  0.79 
Observations 150695  150695  150695  114062  114062 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Column 4 includes scoring above the cut-offs as excluded instruments. Column 5  includes scoring above the cut-
offs and simulated peer quality as excluded instruments. 
 
Table 7:  Placebo Peer Treatments 
Dependent Variable is the Number of Exams Passed 







rank 91+     All 
Peersc-1 0.735  -0.06 -0.231 Female*Peersc-1 0.094
[1.043] [0.102] [0.224]  [0.069] 
Peers  1.733  -0.17 -0.223 Female*Peers  0.1793 
[0.991]+  [0.112] [0.142]  [0.010]+ 
Peersc+1  0.109 0.027 0.319  Female*Peersc+1 0.057 
[0.713] [0.092] [0.200]  [0.135] 
Current minus lag 0.997  -0.109 0.008 0.0853
Current minus lead  1.623  -0.143  -0.542  0.1223 
P-value on lag and lead  0.7  0.75  0.23  0.73 
P-value on current  0.08  0.13 0.14  0.09 
Robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the assigned school level. P-values in parentheses.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
All models include preference fixed effects, and control for the total SEA score, its quadratic and its cubic, and gender. 






Table 8:   Correlations between schools' ranks across years 
Rank  in  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001  2002 
1995 1     
1996 0.993  1     
1997 0.9855  0.9914  1     
1998 0.9838  0.9888  0.9929  1     
1999  0.9779  0.9835 0.991 0.9933  1     
2000  0.9724  0.9793 0.981 0.9877  0.9875  1     
2001  0.9622  0.971  0.9717 0.9754 0.9754  0.9833  1     





Table 9:  Relationship between changes in peer quality and changes in teacher quality  
1 2  3  4 
% Teachers with 
1 -3 years 
experience 
% Teachers 
with 1 -3 years 
experience 
% Teachers 
with 1 -3 years 
experience 
% Teachers 
with a BA 
degree 
Mean total SEA of assigned students -0.01  -0.001  -0.08  0.004 
[0.022] [0.041]  [0.059]  [0.097] 
Assigned School fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Cohort Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 25962  25962  25962  25962 
Robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
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Figure 3:  Distribution of SEA Scores Across Cohorts 
 
Figure 4: Hypothetical Changes in Mean Test Scores Driven Only by Changes in SEA Test score 
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Appendix Figure 1:  Distribution of Peer Quality by School Choice Rank 
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Appendix Figure 3:  Discontinuity in assigned peer quality (raw SEA scores are shown) 




Appendix Note 1: Constructing the Simulated Cut-off 
 
The simulated cut-offs are constructed sequentially as follows: (1) All secondary school sizes are 
fixed based on capacity, (2) all students are put in the applicant pool for their top choice school, 
(3) the school for which the first rejected student has the highest test score fills all its slots (with 
the highest scoring students who listed that school as their first choice), (4) the students who 
were rejected from the top choice school are placed back into the applicant pool and their second 
choice school becomes their first choice school, (5) Steps 2 through 5 are repeated, after 
removing previously assigned students and school slots until the lowest ranked school is filled.  
The only difference between how students are actually assigned and the “tweaked” rule-based 
assignment is that at step (3) the “tweaked” rule does not allow any students to be hand-picked 
while, in fact, some students are hand-picked by principals only at Government assisted schools. 
Jackson (2009, 2010) exploits the discontinuities inherent in the assignment mechanisms to 
identify the effect of attending schools with higher achieving peers. In this paper, I use the school 
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